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HIV AND THE NEED FOR
A VOLUNTARIST APPROACH
David A. Hansell, Esq. *
I. Introduction
In this tenth year of the AIDS epidemic,' evidence abounds that we
have reached a certain high water mark in the public consensus on
how we as a nation should respond to the HIV crisis. Public opinion
polls tell us that Americans have come to understand how little risk
AIDS poses in everyday experience, and overwhelmingly profess sym-
pathy rather than condemnation for people with AIDS.2 Yet these
attitudes often fail to translate into enlightened public policy. In-
stead, we have been consumed with battles over strident and medi-
cally unjustified demands for mandatory AIDS testing and removal
from practice of HIV-infected health-care workers. We have seen
more and more states adopting legislation calling for forced testing of
HIV-infected individuals in certain circumstances, or creating crimi-
nal penalties that stem from the status of HIV infection.' The resur-
* David A. Hansell is the Deputy Executive Director for Policy at Gay Men's
Health Crisis in New York City. He gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Mitchell
Holtzman in the preparation of this essay, and wishes to thank the following individuals
for their helpful comments and suggestions: David Barr, Ronald Bayer, George
Chauncey, Ruth Finkelstein, Geoffrey Knox, Stanley Kurtz, Jeff Levi, Carol Levine,
Michael Musheno, David Rogers, William Rubenstein and Tim Sweeney.
1. See Steven Eisenstat, An Analysis Of The Rationality Of Mandatory Testing For
The HIV Antibody: Balancing The Governmental Public Health Interests With The Indi-
vidual's Privacy Interest, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 327, 327 ("Human Immunodeficiency Vi-
rus ('HIV') was first identified as the cause of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
('AIDS') in 1983").
2. See, e.g., THE ROPER ORGANIZATION, AIDS: PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND EDUCA-
TION NEEDS (1991). In this nationwide poll, the vast majority of respondents indicated
an understanding that AIDS could not be transmitted through casual contact, and 90%
agreed with the statement: "Regardless of who has AIDS, they deserve our compassion."
Id. at 13.
3. The revelation by the Centers for Disease Control of an apparent case of HIV
transmission in a dental practice in Florida led to a widespread public debate over the
risks of HIV infection faced by patients in medical and dental settings. This debate was
played out in the media, in Congress and state legislatures, and culminated in the issu-
ance by the Centers for Disease Control of practice guidelines for HIV-infected doctors
and dentists. See Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Pro-
cedures, 40 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. RR-8, at 5-6 (1991)
[hereinafter CDC Recommendations].
4. See David A. Hansell, HIV Antibody Testing.- Public Health Issues, in AIDS
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gence of tuberculosis in parts of the United States,5 affecting those
who are both HIV-positive and -negative, threatens to renew calls for
isolation and quarantine measures. Steps like these represent draco-
nian responses where sensitivity is needed, and suggest a futile desire
to identify quick fixes for an extremely complex problem.
After a decade of fighting AIDS, the public health community has
come to recognize that strategies to combat the infection must be pre-
mised on voluntarism and not on coercion. This belief is grounded on
a recognition that AIDS is fundamentally different from other sexu-
ally transmitted diseases. Attempts to combat AIDS with coercive
public health strategies stem from a desire to force AIDS into an ill-
fitting traditional disease-response framework, overlooking the differ-
ences between HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases, including
the limitations in available treatment modalities for HIV. A return to
such a cramped, narrowly-medicalized view of the AIDS epidemic
has enormous social implications and a coercive strategy would frus-
trate efforts to stem the spread of the disease. Further, such strategies
would hamper the willingness of those in need of medical care and
education to benefit from existing programs. This essay explores
some of the possible explanations for the apparent erosion of the vol-
untarist consensus and calls for a return to such a voluntarist ap-
proach through effective health care and education efforts.
It is important to note that the perspective reflected in this essay is
that of an organization that provides services to people with AIDS
and HIV infection in the hardest-hit metropolitan area in the nation.6
Gay Men's Health Crisis ("GMHC"), founded in 1982, has assisted
more than 12,000 clients needing emotional and practical support,
legal assistance, financial advocacy, meals and nutritional counseling
and other services. GMHC has been a leader in the area of HIV pre-
vention, offering educational materials, information and intensive
safer sex programs to hundreds of thousands of people at risk. The
views expressed herein are rooted in the agency's philosophy that its
most important goals are to empower people with the knowledge and
skills to live with AIDS, and to live in a world where AIDS will be a
reality for a long time to come.
PRACTICE MANUAL - A LEGAL AND EDUCATIONAL GUIDE (Paul Albert et al. eds.,
1991).
5. See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, Doctors Warn of a Looming TB Threat, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 1991, at 22.
6. See Mary Arrigo, Health-care Givers Mustn't Dodge AIDS, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Mar.
18, 1992, at 89 (interview with Rose Walton) ("New York State has the highest number
of cases of AIDS of any state and NYC has the highest of any city").
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II. The Realities of the AIDS Epidemic
The movement toward coercive strategies to combat AIDS is
rooted largely in public fear and misunderstanding. The public panic
over contracting HIV in the surgical suite or the dental chair, for ex-
ample, reflects continuing, deep-seated misunderstandings about the
disease.7 In contrast, the voluntarist consensus is based on the reali-
ties of the HIV virus, whom it affects and the limited therapeutic in-
terventions that are currently available. The voluntarist consensus
recognizes that persons at risk of HIV infection can best be reached
through a strategy that seeks their cooperation rather than one that
attempts to mandate it.
A. The People At Highest Risk for AIDS
The overlapping communities at highest risk for HIV infection are
gay and bisexual men, men and women of color and intravenous drug
users.8 These groups have historically been suspicious of the public
health establishment or unable to benefit from the existing services.
To understand their suspicion, one need only recall that for decades
homosexuality was treated as a psychopathology to be cured, or the
infamy of the Tuskegee experiment. 9 Because the groups most im-
pacted by the AIDS virus are wary of the public health establishment,
coercive strategies to combat the disease will only intensify their dis-
trust. In short, coercive measures that might succeed in a less
charged environment are destined to fail when dealing with such dis-
enfranchised populations.
B. The Limited Treatment Options for AIDS
The only conditions that could arguably justify using compulsory
strategies to combat an infectious disease do not exist in the AIDS
arena. To date, despite significant progress, only limited treatment
options for people with HIV exist in the medical community. These
treatments do not offer anything approaching a "magic bullet" inter-
vention that would justify coercive or nonconsensual attempts to iden-
tify and treat infected individuals. Similarly, existing therapeutic
interventions have not been shown to reduce infectivity. Hence,
mandatory steps to identify infected individuals will not help to stem
7. See Larry Gostin, A Decade of a Maturing Epidemic: An Assessment and Direc-
tions for Future Public Policy, XVI AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 19 (1990).
8. See AIDS and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States:
1988 Update, 38 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 7, 17 (Supp. S-4) (1989).
9. See JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT
(1981).
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the spread of the virus. Risk-reduction education for all affected com-
munities is the only effective means of furthering the goal of prevent-
ing new infections. Targeting only individuals who are already
infected with HIV is an inadequate response to a pervasive epidemic
about which both the infected and the uninfected need to be educated.
Finally, because HIV cannot be transmitted through casual con-
tact, there is no need for a public health strategy that seeks to identify
infected individuals who may unknowingly spread the disease. In
fact, public identification of infected individuals would do much to
discourage those in need from seeking treatment. Again, the only ef-
fective intervention is to educate all populations at risk about modes
of, and barriers to, HIV transmission.
Thus, the goal of HIV intervention, unlike intervention in relation
to other sexually transmitted disease epidemics, cannot be encapsu-
lated into the relatively simple objectives of identifying those infected
and providing time-limited, curative treatment. Controlling HIV de-
mands much more complex strategies geared not only toward treating
existing cases, but also toward educating the population about preven-
tive measures.
III. The Goals of the Public Health Response to AIDS
The public health response to AIDS, in order to be successful, must
be capable of meeting two goals. First, medical care must be made
available to those in need. Second, the educational measures that fos-
ter long-term behavioral changes that can stem the spread of the dis-
ease must be implemented. There are substantial barriers, however,
to achieving both of these goals.
A. Providing Medical Treatment
Persons who are HIV-infected should be continuously monitored
for immune impairment, and should have access, as early as neces-
sary, to prophylactic treatment to maintain their immune response
and their overall medical condition."0 The adjustment to long-term
pharmacological maintenance may not be easy, but at present it pro-
vides the best hope for preserving the health of HIV-infected individu-
als. 1  Furthermore, the promise of accessible, adequate and
affordable medical treatment is the best incentive for people at risk to
10. See Peter S. Arno, et al., Economic and Policy Implications of Early Intervention




come forward, to learn their HIV status and, in the process, to receive
counseling about risk reduction and transmission prevention.
The United States health-care delivery system is incapable of pro-
viding medical treatment, with any degree of assurance, to the hun-
dreds of thousands of infected and immune-compromised individuals
who need such care. Between thirty-one million and thirty-six million
Americans lack any health insurance, 12 and millions more are inade-
quately insured.13 The annual cost of a standard prophylactic regi-
men for asymptomatic HIV infection totals roughly $10,000 per
person.' 4 Without comprehensive insurance, the cost of care is far
beyond the reach of all but the wealthiest members of our society.
The Medicaid program also fails to provide the necessary care.
Although the primary means of health insurance for the poor, Medi-
caid fails to cover millions of people below the poverty level.15 Fur-
ther, federal Medicaid provisions do not require that the individual
state administrators of Medicaid cover immune-compromised individ-
uals who fail to meet standards for physical disability.I6 Hundreds of
thousands of asymptomatic individuals with the HIV virus do not
qualify for Medicaid coverage. Even those who do qualify for Medi-
caid generally receive only minimal care, with reimbursement rates so
low that many, if not most, physicians in heavily impacted areas re-
fuse to participate in the program.' 7 Thus, the objective of delivering
medical treatment to all HIV-infected individuals in need of care is
undercut by serious inadequacies in the U.S. health-care delivery
system.
B. Providing Education
A second overriding objective of the voluntarist consensus is to ed-
12. See Emily Friedman, The Uninsured: From Dilemma to Crisis, 265 JAMA 2491,
2491 (1991).
13. Id. at 2492.
14. See Arno, supra note 10, at 1497.
15. Medicaid coverage most often accompanies a determination of eligibility for fed-
eral Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, which requires that an individual be
aged, blind or disabled, or Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits, which re-
quire membership in such a family. Indigence and need for medical care alone do not
qualify one for Medicaid under federal mandates. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e) (1989).
16. For the past few years, legislation has been proposed in Congress to authorize
states to offer Medicaid coverage of certain HIV-related services (principally prophylactic
drug therapy) to indigent individuals with HIV infection who are significantly immune-
suppressed. See, e.g., H.R. 1394, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) These individuals would
generally not qualify for Medicaid under existing federal standards. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a) (1989).
17. Jesse Green & Peter S. Arno, The 'Medicaidization' of AIDS: Trends in the Fi-
nancing of HIV-Related Medical Care, 264 JAMA 1261, 1261 (1990).
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ucate persons at risk for HIV infection. These people must be reached
with techniques that have the capability to effect profound, continu-
ous and sustainable behavioral change. It is a formidable public
health education challenge to teach people to modify lifestyles that
include unsafe sexual or drug-using behavior. It is an even greater
challenge to create long-lasting behavioral changes.
Efforts to bring about long-term behavioral modification have met
with little success. Congress and the federal agencies responsible for
AIDS education funding have thwarted practical education efforts to
protect high risk communities and others. Public health agencies and
private organizations have been discouraged from instructing gay men
how to have sex safely, or drug users how to use needles safely, and
have risked losing their federal funds if they do so. In May 1992, a
federal court struck down a set of grant requirements imposed on the
content of AIDS educational materials by the Centers for Disease
Control ("CDC")."s These requirements, promulgated in 1988, re-
quired that materials produced with federal funds use language that
"would be judged by a reasonable person to be inoffensive to most
educated adults" beyond the target audience. 9 The court held that
this requirement was unconstitutionally vague and exceeded the
CDC's statutory authority.2 °
No strategy for responding to HIV will succeed unless it takes as a
fundamental premise that long-term behavioral change, not short-
term intervention, is required. Strategies that look solely toward trac-
ing of infected individuals and treatments that can interrupt the chain
of infection are inapplicable in the context of HIV. Coercive strate-
gies ignore the cooperation necessary to achieve the long-term behav-
ior modifications and to grapple with the HIV epidemic. Routine or
mandatory HIV screening programs violate the voluntarist consensus.
Such programs consume substantial resources, achieve little public
health benefit and jeopardize cooperative efforts that can control the
18. Gay Men's Health Crisis v. Sullivan, No. 88 Civ. 7482 (May 11, 1992). This
action, filed in 1988, challenged the so-called Helms Amendment, adopted by Congress in
1987, which stated that no funds from Centers for Disease Control "shall be used to
provide AIDS education, information or prevention materials or activities that promote
or encourage, directly, homosexuality." Continuing Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 514(a), 101 Stat. 1329, 1329-289 (1987). This language was
incorporated into guidelines for recipients of federal AIDS prevention funds, which were
also challenged in the litigation. Content of AIDS-related Written Material, Pictorials,
Audiovisuals, Questionnaires, Survey Instruments, and Educational Sessions, 53 Fed.
Reg. 6034 (1988) [hereinafter CDC Guidelines].
19. 53 Fed. Reg. 6034.




Identification per se of HIV-infected individuals through routine
screening programs accomplishes nothing, and does not serve the
goals of risk reduction education or referral of those who are infected
to appropriate treatment. In an extreme example, a premarital HIV
screening program enacted (and quickly abandoned) in Illinois drove
thousands of couples out of the state to get married, and cost the state
$312,000 per seropositive test result, hardly a judicious use of public
resources.
22
IV. The Voluntarist Approach
The voluntarist consensus takes these factors into account, and
seeks to combat the AIDS epidemic by encouraging participation
from those people at risk for the disease. The voluntarist consensus is
rooted in a belief that cooperative strategies to combat AIDS are
more practically effective, as well as ethically and constitutionally
palatable, than coercive strategies. The voluntarist consensus, there-
fore, has as its main goal voluntary HIV testing, accompanied by ap-
propriate pre- and post-test counseling. Voluntary HIV testing can
serve as the gateway to medical treatment and educational programs
available to high-risk populations.
A. Voluntary HIV Testing
Voluntary in this context means that HIV testing is undertaken
only with the fully informed consent of the subject. Informed consent
must include an explanation of the HIV antibody test and its mean-
ing, the availability of treatment for HIV infection, the potential psy-
chological and social ramifications of being diagnosed as HIV-
positive, and the limits to confidentiality of HIV-related information
as provided by relevant state law. 23 Without such a process, the edu-
cational value of testing will not be realized, and the individual con-
templating testing will be denied the opportunity to make a voluntary,
autonomous decision.
Voluntarism further demands that the confidentiality of those seek-
ing testing be fully protected, and that testing on an anonymous basis
be available as an alternative to testing by name in the medical setting.
Reporting to governmental authorities the identities of individuals
21. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING
AIDS: UPDATE 1988, at 75.
22. Bernard J. Turnock & Chester J. Kelly, Mandatory Premarital Testing for
Human Immunodeficiency Virus; The Illinois Experience, 261 JAMA 3415, 3415 (1989).
23. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 21, at 72.
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who are HIV-infected will discourage people at risk from coming for-
ward for counseling, testing and treatment. Similarly, societal dis-
crimination against persons with HIV infection must end so that they
can make medically-driven decisions to seek testing and treatment
without risking adverse personal consequences.
B. AIDS Education Programs
Since HIV is transmitted by specific, controllable behaviors for the
most part,24 the voluntarist consensus holds that giving people at risk
the knowledge and the tools to effect long-term behavioral change is
the best way to reduce transmission. Such educational methods serve
a dual purpose: they not only teach infected persons how to avoid
spreading the virus, but they also teach uninfected members of the
same at-risk communities how to avoid being infected, since every un-
safe activity poses reciprocal risks to both participants.
Meaningful AIDS education, however, requires a relationship of
trust and confidence, particularly as it must deal frankly with such
sensitive issues as sexuality and drug use. Furthermore, any educa-
tional program, particularly one whose goal is behavioral change, is
effective only to the extent that it rests upon a desire to incorporate
and act upon the information being shared. Coercive programs are
unlikely to create the motivation needed for AIDS education to be
successful.
V. The Erosion of the Voluntary Consensus
The consensus that has developed around these voluntary strategies
is quite remarkable. The National Academy of Sciences, the Presi-
dent's Commission on the HIV Epidemic, the National Commission
on AIDS, and most components of the professional public health
community agree that a voluntarist approach has merit.25
There even seems to be symbolic judicial support for voluntary
strategies. The New York State Court of Appeals recently upheld a
state health department's decision to treat AIDS along voluntarist
lines and hence differently from other contagious or sexually trans-
mitted diseases.26 This decision constitutes the first state high court
24. Nancy Mueller, The Epidemiology of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infec-
tion, 14 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 250, 256 (1986).
25. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 21; REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COM-
MISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC (1988); AMERICA Liv-
ING WITH AIDS: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE
DEFICIENCY SYNDROME (1991).
26. New York Soc'y of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 77 N.Y.2d 677, 569 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1991)
(upholding a determination of Commissioner of Health and State Public Health Council
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ruling on the voluntarist issue. The development is particularly sig-
nificant coming from the state most heavily affected by the HIV
epidemic.27
Despite these strong signs of support for the voluntary consensus,
there are clear and definite signs that this consensus is eroding and
being replaced with a coercive ideology. Developments within the
medical community and the government itself do not bode well for
the voluntarist strategy.
A. Erosion in the Medical Community
In early June, 1991, only three weeks after the New York Court of
Appeals decision, an editorial in the prestigious New England Journal
of Medicine called for a complete, indeed breathtaking, rollback of the
entire voluntarist strategy.28 In no more than a few paragraphs and
with virtually no analysis or substantiation, the New England Journal
article endorsed routine testing of all health-care workers and pa-
tients, systematic tracing of the sexual partners of HIV-infected per-
sons, and routine screening of all pregnant women and newborns.29
Significantly, the New England Journal article addressed a medical
strategy for the HIV epidemic by divorcing it completely from its so-
cial context. It suggested a so-called "dual approach" to AIDS, one
that "attempts to distinguish social from epidemiologic problems and
that deals with both, simultaneously but separately. ' 30 In other
words, the article argued, concerns about discrimination and access to
treatment must be resolved, but these factors should not impinge on
the medical response to the epidemic, which should proceed along
traditional, coercive public health lines.
B. Erosion in the Government
In the summer of 1991, the United States government reinforced its
existing policy of barring HIV-infected individuals from gaining natu-
ralization or immigration status in the United States. Visitors, immi-
grants, and applicants for permanent residency would continue to be
subject to HIV testing as a potential bar to entry into the United
not to add HIV infection to lists of communicable and sexually transmissible diseases,
based on concern that mandatory testing and contact tracing would prevent infected per-
sons from cooperating with public health officials).
27. See Arrigo, supra note 6.
28. Marcia Angell, A Dual Approach to the AIDS Epidemic, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1498, 1498-1500 (1991).
29. Id. at 1499.
30. Id.
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States.3 HIV was originally added to the list of excludable conditions
in 1987 at the direction of Congress.32 Although Congress removed
this mandate in 1990, 33 The Immigration and Naturalization Service
has to date retained the HIV exclusion. This has the impact of driv-
ing HIV-infected immigrants underground, away from counseling
and health care, because of the reality or the fear that identification of
their HIV status could jeopardize their continued residence in the
United States.
Next, in early July, the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC") is-
sued guidelines prohibiting HIV-infected health-care workers from
engaging in certain forms of medical practice, despite a level of risk to
patients that, by the CDC's own estimates, is minute. 34 Two days
later, the United States Senate overwhelmingly adopted two meas-
ures, one to brand as criminals HIV-infected physicians who perform
"invasive" procedures without informing patients of their HIV sta-
tus, 35 and a second to require that the recently promulgated CDC
guidelines be implemented in every state in the country.36
While this dramatic and disturbing series of events occurred within
a matter of weeks, other currents had been pushing in the direction of
coercive HIV strategies for some time. Beginning in 1987, more and
more states adopted legislation requiring mandatory name reporting
of cases of HIV infection, 37 and the CDC, quietly at first but gradu-
ally more openly, supported that approach.38 Many states passed
laws calling for forced HIV testing of persons suspected or convicted
of sexual assault, or of persons who may have exposed health-care or
emergency response workers to HIV.39 While many of these laws
31. Public Health Service, Interim Rule: Medical Examination of Aliens, 56 Fed.
Reg. 25,000 (May 31, 1991).
32. Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-71, § 518, 101 Stat.
391, 475 (1987).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), as amended by the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067 (1990).
34. The CDC estimated that the risk of HIV transmission from an infected health
care worker to a patient is 2.4 to 24 per 1,000,000 medical procedures. CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL, ESTIMATES OF THE RISK OF ENDEMIC TRANSMISSION OF HBV AND
HIV TO PATIENTS BY THE PERCUTANEOUS ROUTE DURING INVASIVE SURGICAL AND
DENTAL PROCEDURES (Jan. 30, 1991).
35. 137 CONG. REC. S11,792 (1991).
36. 137 CONG. REC. S10,1032 (1991).
37. Hansell, supra note 4, at 3-12.
38. Update.- public health surveillance for HIV infection-United States, 1989 and
1990, 39 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 853, 861 (1990).
39. See Hansell, supra note 4, at 3-7, 3-8. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-
1402(1), (2) (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-29-10 (Law. Co-op. 1989).
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were passed in states with very low HIV incidence,' they nevertheless
reflected a trend that ran counter to the prevailing voluntarist
consensus.
VI. Reasons For the Erosion of the Voluntarist Consensus
A new term has recently entered the AIDS lexicon: HIV exception-
alism.4 1 This term presages a new trend in public health thinking. It
connotes a public health strategy that calls for different measures in
response to AIDS than have traditionally been employed in respond-
ing to other sexually transmitted diseases. Yet acknowledging only
the "exceptional" response to HIV alone ignores the greater reality.
HIV itself is exceptional. It is exceptional in terms of the course of
the infection as compared to other sexually transmitted diseases; it is
exceptional in its mortality rates; it is exceptional in the stigma and
discrimination that it engenders; and it is exceptional in its capacity to
seek out marginalized populations that have long received a dispro-
portionately small allocation of public resources. This more expan-
sive definition of HIV exceptionalism should be considered in terms of
the public health response. While it is true that HIV is an exceptional
disease, to so characterize the public health response to HIV signifies
an important and disturbing shift in the way that HIV has come to be
perceived.
This shift indicates a departure from the earlier response of the
public health community. Although there are no simple answers as to
the validity of the movement away from the voluntarist approach,
there are some explanations for this change of strategy. Some of the
factors causing this shift in opinion are improvements in treatment for
the HIV disease; the concentration of disease in specific, disen-
franchised sectors of society and the changing public perception of the
threat of HIV infection.
A. Improvements in Treatment for HIV Disease
Perhaps the pivotal issue affecting the voluntarist-coercive debate
has been the improvement of treatment options for HIV-infected,
asymptomatic individuals. Though far from the stage at which symp-
tomatic HIV disease can be held at bay indefinitely, medical science
now offers interventions with clear benefits for those with impaired
40. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT 5 (Apr.
1991).
41. Ronald Bayer, Public Health Policy and the AIDS Epidemic - an End to HIV
Exceptionalism?, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1500, 1500 (1991).
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but still functioning immune systems.42 Early knowledge of HIV sta-
tus has thus become important as the trigger for prophylactic treat-
ment regimens.
The response to these developments has been schizophrenic. One
might well have expected that they would further bolster the volunta-
rist view. Against the pre-existing social backdrop, which strongly
militates in favor of a scheme based upon individual, autonomous de-
cision making, has been added a powerful incentive for persons at risk
to opt for testing: the promise of life-extending (if not curative) treat-
ment. This incentive would seem to dictate a framework that looks to
voluntary choice as its touchstone. Educating people about treatment
advances, protecting them from breaches of confidentiality and dis-
crimination, and creating systems to deliver treatment to those who
need it are methods by which the voluntarist approach could be fully
implemented. Additionally, a powerful program for encouraging en-
trance to the public health system, even for those at-risk communities
otherwise skeptical of it, would round out a voluntarist strategy.
The debate has not generally advanced in this direction. To tradi-
tional public health practitioners, the more HIV-related treatment im-
proves, the more the disease begins to look just like any other sexually
transmitted phenomenon, and the more it should be treated as such.
It is as though, once medical science has begun to offer a response -
however inadequate that response may be - the entire societal con-
text that has helped to shape the public health strategy fades into the
background. Once again, it is suggested that people at risk for HIV
no longer be treated as autonomous individuals acting in their own
self-interest, but rather that they be viewed as recalcitrant and un-
trustworthy populations who must be coerced into testing and treat-
ment for their own good. While the motives behind this shift -
attempting to secure the delivery of HIV-related treatment to the
maximum number of infected individuals - may be worthy, those
adopting this coercive perspective fail to consider the context of the
HIV epidemic.
B. The Ghettoization of the Epidemic
Although AIDS was initially perceived as a gay disease, and indeed
has had an enormously disproportionate effect on the gay male com-
munity, public health practitioners and others long expected that, like
other epidemics, AIDS would gradually fan out more randomly
throughout the population, posing a more appreciable risk to all. To
42. Arno, supra note 10, at 1494.
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a great extent, however, the epidemic in the United States has actually
remained ghettoized within a small set of groups: men who have sex
with men, male injection drug users, and women who either use drugs
themselves or are sexual partners of men who do. As AIDS comes to
be seen as less of a threat to the general public, coercive responses are
likewise less threatening to those who, by and large, shape public pol-
icy in this area. It is they, not we, who will be inconvenienced or
whose livelihoods may be jeopardized by mandatory testing or name
reporting programs, and the discriminatory consequences that could
follow. Furthermore, the communities increasingly affected by AIDS
- poor, disenfranchised people of color - are likely to be viewed by
the public health traditionalists as less able to be educated and less
compliant with voluntary strategies, and hence more demanding of
coercive measures.
As AIDS is seen as increasingly ghettoized among disenfranchised
populations, the political temptation to use the disease as an opportu-
nity to pursue tangential moral agendas also may increase. As men-
tioned above, both homosexual behavior and intravenous drug use
have been adversely targeted by the federal government, in the form
of restrictions on the use of AIDS education dollars to teach these
groups how to avoid transmission.43 Because these groups may be
seen as having the potential to "infect" the general public in ways that
have nothing to do with HIV, coercive measures may be seen as pro-
tecting the public, if not from HIV itself, then from the moral conta-
gion associated with those disproportionately affected by the
epidemic.
C. The Changing Locus of Threat
A corollary to the ghettoization phenomenon has to do with a de-
sire of the "general public" to eliminate even minimal risks that do
not so conveniently discriminate by social strata. As the predominant
modes of transmission have become less threatening, a compulsion to
seek even greater guarantees of safety emerges. Hence, the obsessive
quality of the debate over transmission in the health-care setting, and
over the appropriateness of testing doctors and patients. If routine
dental visits come to be perceived as the predominant HIV risk to
white, middle-class, heterosexual individuals, however minimal that
risk may be, then public health policy must be driven by the elimina-
tion of that risk, whatever damage may be done in the process.
The degree of public and media hysteria over the issue of health-
43. See supra note 19.
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care worker-to-patient transmission of HIV would seem to support
this thesis. The coverage of this phenomenon has been so utterly out
of proportion to its epidemiologic significance - five cases of infec-
tion among dental patients," with the route of transmission unknown,
and no confirmed infections by surgeons or other health-care practi-
tioners - and to other non-HIV risks to patients in the health-care
setting, that it demands explanation. The superficially appealing pos-
sibility of isolating and eliminating this threat, however inconsequen-
tial it may be, has come to assume paramount importance. The costs
(in dollars, lost careers, and quality of health care) of attempting to
eradicate worker-to-patient transmission of HIV from the health-care
setting are ignored. And the relatively narrow context in which this
issue arises plays into a more general sense of HIV as a problem that
can be isolated and eliminated, if proper steps are taken.
In a similar vein, the public has expressed strong support for immi-
gration restrictions targeting persons with HIV infection45 -
notwithstanding the fact that the rate of infection within the United
States is higher than almost anywhere else in the world. 46 Again, this
public support reflects a belief that HIV is a problem that people can
protect themselves from by segregation from others.
D. The Purported Failure of Current Approaches
Another factor undergirding the shift away from voluntarist
schemes is the sense that measures tried to date in combatting the
HIV epidemic have simply not worked. There is, of course, one naive
piece of evidence supporting this analysis: the number of new cases of
AIDS continues to climb rapidly in the United States .4  But that evi-
dence is false and misleading in several critical respects.
First, the incidence of new cases today reflects the incidence of HIV
infections that occurred ten to fourteen years ago. Despite the rise in
the number of new AIDS cases, there is powerful evidence of massive
behavioral change in parts of the gay community beginning in the
44. See CDC Recommendations, supra note 3, at 3.
45. On June 2, 1987, the HIV virus was added to the list of "dangerous contagious
diseases" that exclude aliens who are afflicted with them from entering the United States.
See 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(b)(4) (1990). The others are chancroid, gonorrhea, granuloma in-
guinale, infectious leprosy, lympho granuloma, venereum, infectious syphilis and active
tuberculosis. Id. See also Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat.
4978, 5067 (1990).
46. See, e.g., Thomas C. Quinn, et al., AIDS in the Americas: a public health priority
for the region, 4 AIDS 709, 709-24 (1990).
47. See supra note 40, at -.
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early to mid-1980s.48 This change in behavior is evidenced by enor-
mous reductions in rates of other sexually-transmitted diseases that
are more readily manifest and diagnosable. This change, which is
largely the product of self-initiated efforts within portions of the gay
community to educate its members about transmission risks, supports
the theory that providing the right information and support to indi-
viduals making voluntary decisions about behavioral change is the
most powerful way to reduce transmission.
Second, the conclusion that the strategies implemented to date have
not worked assumes that such strategies have been fully tested. In
reality, the efforts at HIV prevention education have been half-
hearted, have not been well-targeted toward all communities at risk
and have not used the kinds of explicit and culturally relevant materi-
als that are most effective. Furthermore, educational efforts to date
have often conveyed inaccurate or misleading information (or failed
to discuss more realistically effective strategies, such as condom use).
Additionally, these efforts have not been supported by programs to
sustain behavioral change.
Similarly, the lack of accessible HIV-related medical treatment for
many of those at high risk - often because they lack accessible health
care of any kind - means that theoretical incentives to seek counsel-
ing and testing may indeed be purely theoretical and not available in
the real world.
Finally, of course, the "traditional" disease response model has
hardly been a resounding success. Other sexually transmitted diseases
have not been eliminated, but are rapidly on the increase, despite pub-
lic health responses that involve case reporting and aggressive contact
tracing and treatment. The frustration with our failure to control
HIV reflects less the superiority of other models than the reluctance
to acknowledge HIV for what it is: an epidemic involving a virus that
has a long latency period and that is as yet unsusceptible to attack.
We must come to accept that this is an epidemic that is going to be
with us for some time, but that we do have the ability to control it if
we respond in rational, effective ways.
VII. The Need to Refocus the Debate
It is, of course, impossible to say what precise combination of the
above factors, or perhaps factors altogether different, has resulted in
the current retrenchment from the voluntarist response to the epi-
48. See Warren Winkelstein, et al., Sexual practices and risk of infection by the human
immunodeficiency virus; The San Francisco men's health study, 257 JAMA 321, 321-25
(1987).
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demic. Without aggressive efforts to reframe the current debate, how-
ever, the traditional, coercive methodology which appears to be on
the ascendancy, in all likelihood, will continue to gain force.
To accomplish a refocussing of attention, and a halt to the erosion
in support for the voluntarist consensus, it is necessary to return to
the basic premises underlying that consensus, and to demonstrate that
these principles are still valid. It remains true today that our best
hope of controlling the HIV epidemic lies in long-term, sustainable
medical maintenance and behavior change. These goals are achieva-
ble only with the active, voluntary cooperation of individuals and
communities at risk. While there is a seductive concreteness and tan-
gibility to the notion of widespread, mandatory HIV antibody testing
as a public health tool, we must continually ask the question, "Testing
toward what end?" Absent means of eradicating the virus or elimi-
nating the ability to pass it on to others, there is simply no valid goal
to be achieved by mandatory testing. This being the case, coercive
testing regimes will only undercut efforts to secure broad, voluntary
compliance necessary to control the spread of AIDS.
Instead of retreating from the voluntarist strategies, we ought to
make a concerted commitment to make those strategies fully effec-
tive. Developing a structure to deliver HIV-related health care, par-
ticularly with regard to early intervention, to infected individuals
would create a strong pull into the system. The availability of ade-
quate health care would eliminate the need for coercive measures that
force people into testing and treatment. Designing programs to teach,
support and sustain long-term behavioral change in all populations at
risk would do more to check the spread of the epidemic than massive
testing. And respecting the rights of persons at risk for HIV to make
their own decisions on these matters will ultimately lead to greater
compliance with an effective public health agenda. One can only hope
that we will not abandon this approach, which rests, ultimately, upon
plain notions of human dignity and independence.
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